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The paper outlines the current healthcare sector reform 
process in Kosovo and the challenges to its implemen-
tation. The reform attempts to introduce modern public 
management principles into Kosovo’s healthcare sector, 
including a purchaser–provider split, performance incen-
tives, and performance-based contracting, as well as a reor-
ganisation of healthcare service delivery with a view to im-
proving effectiveness and efficiency. This is the first major 
reform of the healthcare sector since Kosovo declared its 
independence in 2008. A key challenge lies in the limited 
capacities of the Kosovo Government to implement such 
an ambitious reform. This is also an attempt to introduce 
modern public management principles into a public ad-
ministration which is dominated by traditional public ad-
ministration principles. Thus the lack of implementation 
capacities and contradictory public administration princi-
ples are the most important factors that may endanger the 
successful implementation of the reform.
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1. Introduction
This paper presents and discusses certain key aspects of the reform of 
Kosovo’s health sector, which was initiated in 2009 and is still in pro-
gress. In the paper, health sector reform is understood as the sustained 
and purposive change to improve the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness 
of the health sector, with the goal of improving health status, obtaining 
greater equity, and obtaining greater cost-effectiveness for the services 
provided (Percival & Sondrop, 2010, p. 1). The very purpose of the lat-
est of reforms in Kosovo’s health sector is to move away from the tradi-
tional public administration model and to introduce public management 
principles to improve cost-effectiveness and healthcare quality. The tra-
ditional model of public administration is characterised by a hierarchical 
bureaucracy, staffed by professional and politically neutral civil servants 
who execute policies developed at the political level, irrespective of which 
political party is in power (Hughes, 2012, p. 43-44). Public management, 
as opposed to the traditional public administration model, is seen as a 
different approach to the delivery of public services because (1) it focuses 
on outputs and outcomes rather than on inputs and processes, (2) public 
service performance is measured on the basis of performance indicators 
and standards, (3) public services are delivered on the basis on contractu-
al and contract-like arrangements, (4) market-like mechanisms (such as 
privatisation of public services, outsourcing, public–private partnerships, 
competition, and creation of artificial markets through rationing and li-
censing) are introduced into the public service in order to improve its 
effectiveness and efficiency (Hughes, 2012, p. 88). 
Kosovo’s health sector reform must be analysed in view of the historical 
background that led to the re-establishment of the health sector following 
the armed conflict in 1998–99, NATO’s military intervention, and the 
establishment of a United Nations (UN) interim administration in Koso-
vo in 1999. Although the UN re-established Kosovo’s healthcare system, 
subsequent efforts to reform the system and to improve its performance 
failed. The Kosovo Government has initiated a new and ambitious health-
care reform building on the existing healthcare system, which was initially 






























established by the UN. However, this reform faces serious challenges. 
Most importantly, it is an effort to introduce public management prin-
ciples into the healthcare sector, while the overall administrative system 
follows traditional administration principles. While the policy design of 
the reform is sound, the implementation is the weak part of the reform 
process and likely to lead to another reform failure.
The purpose of the paper is to show that introducing complex new pub-
lic management mechanisms such as the purchaser–provider split and 
performance-based contracting into the health sector, while the overall 
administrative system is still based on the principles of traditional public 
administration, coupled with weak management and implementation ca-
pacities, might be counterproductive for the improvement of efficiency, 
effectiveness, and equity in the healthcare sector. 
2. Development of Kosovo’s Health Sector
With a population of around 1.8 million, Kosovo has a GDP per capita of 
2,935 € and can thus be categorised as a lower middle-income country. 
Around 50% of the population is under 25 years of age, which means 
that Kosovo has one of the youngest populations in Europe. However, 
the youth unemployment rate is officially at 30.2%, while unofficial ac-
counts estimate it to be around 55%. The total unemployment rate is at 
35%. Thirty-five per cent of the population lives below the poverty line of 
1.42 €/day, while 12.1% lives in extreme poverty with less than 0.92 €/day 
(Muzik & Uka, 2013, p. 1). Life expectancy is at around 69 years, which is 
among the lowest in Europe, and government spending on health stands 
at 6.6% of GDP, which is also one of the lowest figures in Europe.
Before it declared independence in 2008, Kosovo was administered by 
the UN, beginning in 1999. The UN Interim Administration Mission was 
established by the UN, following a military intervention led by NATO 
against Serbia in response to massive human rights violations and the 
forceful expulsion of a large portion of Kosovo’s civilian population. Be-
fore the intervention Kosovo was an autonomous province of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which disintegrated in 1992, and sub-
sequently it remained part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which 
included only Serbia and Montenegro. Its socialist past was reflected in 
Kosovo’s health system, which was the same for the whole of Yugosla-
via and was based on decentralised decision-making and specialisation 
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of healthcare services. Polyclinics in major towns and municipalities were 
the first points of contact for patients and included different specialised 
healthcare services. The central government was both the purchaser and 
provider of healthcare services, while decision-making was decentralised 
to hospitals and healthcare centres (Percival & Sondrop, 2010, p. 3).
Following the establishment of the UN administration in 1999, one of 
the first challenges for the international administration was to re-establish 
the healthcare system. Most of the healthcare centres had been damaged 
during the conflict or had been left without equipment and supplies. Most 
of the Serb medical personnel had left Kosovo, while the Albanian medi-
cal personnel were ill-prepared for the tasks due to a decade of exclusion 
from meaningful participation in the public health sector and a severe 
shortage of qualified doctors (Percival & Sondrop, 2010, p. 5). The qual-
ity of the public healthcare system was compromised by the following 
factors: (1) shortages of healthcare personnel in rural areas, (2) lack of a 
functioning referral system, (3) duplication and inefficiency of healthcare 
services due to lack of cooperation and coordination between separate 
clinics and departments within the same hospital, and (4) high costs of 
access to healthcare services. Although healthcare services were officially 
free of charge, as they were funded by the government, patients incurred 
costs due to corruption and the need for private purchase of medication 
and basic material to be used by the doctors for medical treatment (Per-
cival & Sondrop, 2010, p. 5).
In 2000 the UN established the Administrative Department of Health 
and Social Welfare, which was responsible for the overall management of 
matters relating to health and social welfare in Kosovo (UNMIK Regula-
tion No. 2000/10, Section 1.2). All administrative departments that were 
established by the UN operated under the overall legislative and execu-
tive authority of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/1, Section 1a) and were thus directly at-
tributable to the UN. In 2001 the administrative department was trans-
formed into the Ministry of Health, Environment and Spatial Planning 
(UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/19, Annex VI), while in 2002 a separate 
Ministry of Health was established (UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/5, 
Annex VI). The Ministry functioned under the Constitutional Frame-
work for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, under which certain 
responsibilities were transferred to the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government under the overall authority of the UN.
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A first step towards the reform of the healthcare sector was the intro-
duction in 2000 of a patient co-payment system to supplement budget 
financing (Percival & Sondrop, 2010, p. 5). Despite this, the financing 
of the healthcare system remained dependent on financial support from 
international donor organisations, amounting to around 80 million € just 
between 1999 and 2002 (Percival & Sondrop, 2010, p. 6). In view of this 
situation, the UN Interim Administration undertook the first major at-
tempt to reform the healthcare system following the end of the conflict. 
A comprehensive legal framework was adopted to regulate the health sec-
tor, including a Law on Health, a Law on Private Practices in Health, 
and a Law on the Health Inspectorate. The objective of the reform was 
to strengthen primary healthcare services through the introduction of a 
family-medicine structure and to permit specialist treatment at secondary 
and tertiary level on a referral basis only, except in cases of emergency 
(Percival & Sondrop, 2010, p. 7). The secondary level would consist of 
five hospitals and the tertiary level would be composed of the University 
Clinic in Prishtina. A further objective of the reform was to improve ef-
ficiency in hospitals through a reduction of the number of beds and the 
introduction of performance contracts and service agreements (Percival 
& Sondrop, 2010, p. 7). The third component of the reform was the estab-
lishment of the Health Care Commissioning Agency within the Ministry 
of Health, as the predecessor of a health insurance fund to be established 
in future. The primary task of the Health Care Commissioning Agency 
was to create the basis for a split between purchaser and provider func-
tions through performance-based contracts with municipalities for pri-
mary healthcare services, and with hospitals and the University Clinic in 
Prishtina for secondary and tertiary healthcare services (Percival & Son-
drop, 2010, p. 9). Furthermore, private clinics were permitted to operate 
subject to licensing and oversight by the Ministry of Health. A Health 
Inspectorate was established within the Ministry of Health to supervise 
the implementation by healthcare institutions of ethical and professional 
standards set by the Ministry of Health.
However, this reform enjoyed limited success for the following reasons 
(Percival & Sondrop, 2010, p. 8-10):
1. The referral system failed due to “perverse” incentives resulting from 
the structure of the healthcare system. Low salaries in the public 
healthcare sector incentivised many family doctors to either leave the 
public healthcare sector entirely or to set up their own private clinics, 
where they would continue to work after their regular working hours. 
Referrals were very often made on the basis of “old practices”, i.e., au-
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tomatic referrals without giving priority to treatment at primary level, 
or referrals to private clinics, where the same healthcare services were 
provided but at a much higher cost for patients.
2. The secondary and tertiary healthcare levels were underfunded, as 
the expectation was that the referral system would function and keep 
most of the medical treatment at primary healthcare level. This led to 
a deterioration of the quality of healthcare services at the secondary 
and tertiary levels.
3. The introduction of co-payments, the need for additional out-of-
pocket payments, coupled with increased payment for private health-
care services due to referrals to private clinics, and other payments 
connected with corruption resulted in increased costs and barriers to 
access to healthcare services.
4. An inadequate health information system, coupled with lack of ade-
quate management and accounting capacities across the sector, frus-
trated attempts to establish the foundations for a future split between 
purchaser and provider functions.
5. Immediately after its establishment, the Ministry of Health was con-
fronted with charges of corruption and politicisation of appointments 
to civil service positions. This was aggravated by a lack of cooperation 
with international donors and local stakeholders, which hindered the 
implementation of the health sector reform. On top of that, the Min-
istry’s professional capacities were limited because the civil service 
was recently put in place and lacked the necessary experience, and 
because positions were frequently filled based on political preferenc-
es rather than professional qualifications. The Ministry thus failed to 
exercise the stewardship function which was necessary to move the 
reform process forward.
A new reform was attempted in 2009. This time, the key difference was 
that the reform had local ownership as it was driven by the Ministry of 
Health and not by the UN. This was because in 2008 Kosovo had de-
clared independence and the UN had since then ceased to exercise ad-
ministrative functions in Kosovo.
3. The New Health Sector Reform
In 2009 the government adopted a new Health Sector Strategy which set 
three strategic objectives for the reorganisation of the health sector: (1) 
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the improvement of the management of existing resources and quality of 
services, (2) a reorganisation and completion of the existing infrastruc-
ture of the healthcare system and the procurement of medical equipment 
in accordance with European standards, and (3) the development of a 
sustainable funding system for the health sector (Health Sector Strategy, 
2009).
Based on these general objectives, the health reform was based on the 
following principles:
1. Introduction of a purchaser–provider split with an autonomous pur-
chaser who will be responsible for purchasing health services from 
public and private health facilities.
2. Provider payment reforms which will introduce performance incen-
tives to increase efficiency and improve quality, accompanied by cor-
responding changes in governance and accountability arrangements 
to give providers the autonomy to respond to performance incen-
tives. Both hospitals and primary care facilities will ultimately be paid 
based on outputs adjusted for quality. 
3. Introduction of mandatory health insurance to be funded through a 
combination of general tax revenues and citizen premiums (Health 
Sector Strategy, 2009).
The key elements of this reform were: (1) the introduction of a mandatory 
health insurance system, including the establishment of a Health Insur-
ance Fund, (2) a redesign of the functions of the Ministry of Health, (3) 
the establishment of chambers of healthcare professionals to act as regu-
lators of the medical profession, and (4) a redesign of the organisational 
structure of healthcare institutions, including the establishment of Koso-
vo Hospital and University Clinical Services as providers of healthcare 
services (Health Sector Strategy, 2009). In line with this, the Assembly 
of Kosovo adopted a new Law on Health in 2012, thereby formally en-
dorsing the comprehensive reform of Kosovo’s health sector. In addition, 
a new Law on Health Insurance and a Law on Chambers of Healthcare 
Professionals were adopted. 
The reform process is confirmed by the new Health Sector Strategy 2015–
2020, which is pending approval by the government. The fundamental 
pillars of the reform continue to be (1) the change of the health financ-
ing system from the existing centralised budget model into a combined 
financing model by both the budget and public and private health insur-
ance systems, and (2) the decentralisation of the management of health 
institutions and professional resources from the political level to health 
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institutions and health professionals themselves. The main purpose of the 
reform would be to make the Health Insurance Fund functional and to 
establish a definitive separation between the purchasers and providers of 
healthcare services. The Ministry of Health would have to be reorganised 
to strengthen its policy-making, regulatory, evaluation, and monitoring 
functions (Draft Health Sector Strategy, 2015)
However, as soon as the reform had begun, it was immediately resist-
ed by certain interest groups, most notably by the medical profession, 
which was also strongly represented in the Kosovo Parliament. One of 
the critical provisions of the new Law on Health was the prohibition of 
health professionals who are employed in the public sector on a full-time 
or part-time basis to work in private healthcare institutions. It also in-
cluded the prohibition of referring patients from a secondary or tertiary 
public healthcare institution to a private healthcare institution, unless jus-
tified for medical reasons (Constitutional Court 2013, p. 7). The purpose 
of this provision was to combat the illicit practice of referrals to private 
healthcare institutions, which was considered to constitute a conflict of 
interest (Constitutional Court 2013, p. 25) and a major source of cor-
ruption and malpractice in the public healthcare sector, given that many 
healthcare professionals who worked in public healthcare institutions also 
had their own private healthcare institutions. This practice was one of the 
main reasons why previous reform efforts had failed. This provision was 
challenged by several parliamentarians, led by a senior politician of the 
ruling political party who also happened to be a healthcare professional 
with a private healthcare institution. The challenge was made because 
the provision in question would violate the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to work (Constitutional Court 2013, p.2). The Constitutional Court 
ruled that such a restriction would be an unjustified interference with the 
right to work. The Constitutional Court reasoned that the Ministry of 
Health had not demonstrated how such a prohibition would contribute to 
securing comprehensive and quality healthcare in the public sector (Con-
stitutional Court 2013, p. 28), and other less restrictive measures had not 
been assessed at all (Constitutional Court 2013, p. 30). Consequently, 
the Constitutional Court declared the provision to be unconstitutional 
and the Law on Health entered into force without this provision. Thus 
one of the cornerstones of the reform, i.e., the intention to combat illic-
it referrals from public to private healthcare institutions, which were a 
source of corruption and increased costs for patients, was destroyed even 
before the reform could kick off.
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4. Health Sector Organisation
The new reform organised the health sector around the Ministry of Health 
and the chambers of healthcare professionals as regulators; public and 
private healthcare institutions, including Kosovo Hospital and University 
Clinical Services (Kosovo Clinical Services, KCS), as providers of health-
care services; and the Health Financing Agency, to be succeeded by the 
Health Insurance Fund, as the purchaser of healthcare services (Draft 
Health Sector Strategy, 2015).
4.1.  Healthcare Regulators
The Ministry of Health and the chambers of health professionals exercise 
regulatory and oversight functions over the health sector. The Ministry’s pri-
mary role is to develop and implement health sector policies and laws, and 
to develop standards and regulations for the health sector. In addition, it has 
“stewardship and regulatory” functions, including the development of stand-
ards, development of healthcare infrastructure, human resources planning, 
and overall supervisory functions. The Ministry is supported by the Health 
Inspectorate and a Pharmaceutical Inspectorate as administrative bodies 
within the Ministry which exercise supervisory and monitoring functions.
The chambers of health professionals are professional organisations estab-
lished by the Kosovo Assembly. They include chambers of doctors, dentists, 
pharmacists, physiotherapists, nurses, midwives, and other healthcare profes-
sionals. The chambers exercise certain public functions, such as the approval 
of the code of professional ethics for healthcare professionals, licensing of 
healthcare professionals, professional supervision, verification, and organisa-
tion of professional examinations. They are financed by the budget of the Re-
public of Kosovo for a three-year transitional period, after which they will be 
self-financed by means of membership fees, charges for licensing, and other 
fees and charges for services delivered to healthcare professionals.
4.2.  Healthcare Providers
Healthcare services are provided by public, private, or joint public-pri-
vate healthcare institutions. These are divided into primary, secondary, 
and tertiary healthcare institutions. While primary healthcare institutions 
remain under the administrative responsibility of the municipalities, sec-
16




















ondary and tertiary healthcare institutions are merged into KCS. Profes-
sional supervision of healthcare institutions is provided by chambers of 
healthcare professionals, while compliance with laws and standards is su-
pervised by the Ministry through its inspectorates.
Primary healthcare services are provided by family health centres at the 
municipal level. Secondary healthcare institutions include general and 
special hospitals, specialist polyclinics, specialist offices, dentist offic-
es, mental health centres, blood transfusion centres, and other medical 
centres. Tertiary healthcare institutions consist of the University Clinical 
Centre, University Dentistry Clinical Centre, National Institute of Public 
Health, and other national medical centres.
A novelty among healthcare institutions is KCS. It is designed as a unitary 
health institution composed of all the secondary and tertiary healthcare 
institutions. The secondary and tertiary healthcare institutions, which 
were integrated into and are now part of KCS, have the status of autono-
mous units within KCS, while legal personality is accorded to KCS only. 
Although at the initial stage of the reform only secondary and tertiary 
level healthcare institutions will be part of KCS, the Ministry of Health 
envisages the integration of primary healthcare institutions and private 
healthcare institutions into KCS at a later stage.
KCS is responsible for the provision of quality healthcare services based 
on performance, efficiency, and effectiveness. It is also mandated to coor-
dinate specialised healthcare services and to ensure a high level of transfer 
and sharing of professional knowledge and experience between its constit-
uent healthcare institutions. KCS is directed by a managing board com-
prised of seven members, who are appointed by the government upon the 
proposal of the minister of health. A representative of the Ministry is a 
member of the managing board. The managing board is accountable to 
the government through the minister of health. A general director, ap-
pointed by the managing board, manages the operational affairs of KCS 
and is responsible for its professional and financial performance.
The general idea behind the reform on the side of the provider is to in-
troduce competition between healthcare institutions through contracts 
between them and the Health Financing Agency, and later the Health 
Insurance Fund. It is expected that with a fixed price for basic healthcare 
services, quality and the introduction of more efficient treatment methods 
will be the only parameters whereby the hospitals will be able to attract 
patients. The expectation is that this will introduce incentives to improve 
the quality of healthcare services.
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The expectation is also that KCS will strengthen the capacity for manage-
ment, planning, and administration of the healthcare institutions which 
are part of it, and will thereby contribute to improving the management 
efficiency of healthcare institutions as providers of healthcare services. 
The functions currently exercised by the Ministry of Health with regard 
to supporting the operational aspects of healthcare institutions will be ex-
ercised by KCS. The intention is to establish clearer lines of responsibility 
and accountability, and to have a better separation between policy-mak-
ing at Ministry level and operations at the level of KCS.
With the management of hospitals handed over to KCS, the Ministry will 
be able to focus more on its core tasks of policy-making, supporting political 
decision-making, defining strategic development, identifying incentives for 
the implementation of policies, strategies, norms, and standards, as well as 
drafting laws, but it will also be able to focus more on steering the reform 
process. This will require the establishment of a new organisational structure 
and professional capacities for policy-making, monitoring, and oversight. 
4.3.  Healthcare Purchasers
The purchasers of healthcare services are the Health Financing Agency 
and the Health Insurance Fund (once it has been established), as the 
future successor of the Health Financing Agency. The Health Insurance 
Fund negotiates and contracts basic healthcare services with healthcare 
institutions, which are licensed by the Ministry. The Health Insurance 
Fund is an independent legal entity established by law and managed by a 
steering board whose members are appointed by the government.
Until such time as the Health Insurance Fund is established, the Health 
Financing Agency, which is an executive agency of the Ministry of Health, 
will negotiate and enter into contracts with licensed healthcare institutions 
for the provision of basic healthcare services. The list of basic healthcare 
services will be approved by the government on an annual basis. Upon es-
tablishment of the Health Insurance Fund, the Health Financing Agency 
will gradually transfer its rights and responsibilities to the Fund.
4.4.  Healthcare Financing
Healthcare financing is a mixed model of financing by both the budget 
and the health insurance system. In the initial stage, basic healthcare ser-
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vices will be funded by the budget and by co-payments made by patients, 
except for those patients who are exempt by law. Supplementary health-
care services will be funded by payments made by local or international 
health insurance companies.
With the establishment of mandatory health insurance, patients who pay 
premiums into the Health Insurance Fund, as well as those who are ex-
empt from paying a premium, will have access to basic healthcare ser-
vices approved by the government and provided by healthcare institu-
tions which have entered into a contract with the Health Insurance Fund. 
The Health Insurance Fund will also receive transfers from the budget 
to cover basic healthcare services for persons exempt by law from paying 
premiums into the Health Insurance Fund. Non-insured patients and pa-
tients with private insurance will be entitled to emergency services free of 
charge, but will, for all other services, pay a price as defined by the price 
list for basic healthcare services.
The idea is that by the final stage of the reform, when the Health Insur-
ance Fund is expected to have contracted private healthcare institutions 
as well, the price list for basic healthcare services will be applicable to all 
healthcare providers who will compete to attract patients. Supplementa-
ry healthcare services, i.e., those beyond the list of basic healthcare ser-
vices approved by the government, will be provided at the market price 
calculated by each healthcare institution, or via private health insurance 
schemes. 
5. Problems and Issues
There are several issues which require further attention because they are 
critical to the overall success of the reform.
5.1.  Purchaser–Provider Split
Despite the government’s explicit objective to introduce a separation 
between purchaser and provider in the health sector, there is concern 
about a possible confusion of the roles of purchaser and provider. The 
purchaser–provider split aims to introduce quasi-market incentives into 
the delivery of public services. Although there seems to be no generally 
accepted definition of the purchaser–provider split (Tynkkynen, Keski-
maki & Lehto, 2013, p. 221), it may be described in broad terms as an 
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arrangement whereby the purchaser decides what and how much will be 
produced, while the provider delivers the agreed services (Ryan, Parker & 
Brown, 2000, p. 221). This means that the purchaser of a service, who also 
pays for it, is organisationally separated from the service provider and that 
the relationship between purchaser and provider is regulated by contracts 
(Tynkkynen, Keskimaki & Lehto, 2013, p. 221). The expectation is that 
such a separation between the purchaser and the provider and the con-
tractual relationship between the two would create incentives that would 
lead to improvements in cost-effectiveness, greater efficiency, organisa-
tional flexibility, and, especially in the health sector, improved responsive-
ness of services to patient needs. The purchaser–provider split works on 
the assumption that the purchaser will be able to articulate the needs of 
the population and thereby determine what and how much of it should be 
produced. It is also assumed that a separate purchaser would have better 
awareness of the cost-effectiveness and quality of services, and thus allo-
cate resources more efficiently (Tynkkynen, Keskimaki & Lehto, 2013, p. 
221). The provider would be distanced from policy-making and would de-
liver services based on the performance and output indicators defined in 
the contract with the purchaser (Ryan, Parker & Brown, 2000, p. 221). A 
further benefit of the purchaser–provider split would be the ability of the 
purchaser to contract different providers and thus introduce competition 
between providers, which is expected to lead to improved efficiency and 
service quality (Tynkkynen, Keskimaki & Lehto, 2013, p. 221).
Applying this concept to the health sector means that healthcare institu-
tions such as hospitals are the providers of healthcare services. They would 
generate revenue by delivering healthcare services based on contracts with 
the purchaser, i.e., the Health Insurance Fund, instead of being funded 
by the government budget. Competition between different providers for 
contracts with the purchaser would require the providers to deliver more 
services at higher quality and lower cost, which would eventually lead to 
better value for money of the healthcare services they provide.
The purchaser–provider split adopted in Kosovo’s health sector reform 
does not possess all the above features. The provisions in the Law on 
Health1 and the Statute of KCS2 are contradictory and confusing in re-
spect of the purchaser–provider separation. The general rule seems to be 
1 Law No. 04/L-125 on Health, Official Gazette 13/2013.
2 Statute of the Hospital and University Clinical Kosovo Clinical Service of Kosovo, 
adopted by the Government of Kosovo on 11.09.2013 (Decision no. 05/148).
20




















that the Health Financing Agency is required to negotiate and contract 
healthcare services with healthcare institutions, which implies cost-effec-
tiveness competition between different healthcare institutions as provid-
ers. The details, however, are not entirely clear and allow for different 
legal interpretations.
On the one hand, KCS is required to enter into contractual relations with 
the Health Financing Agency. As KCS integrates all secondary and ter-
tiary healthcare institutions as its organisational units, the price list pro-
posed by KCS and approved by the Health Financing Agency, and any 
contract entered into between KCS and the Health Financing Agency 
will also be applicable to healthcare institutions which are components 
of KCS. This will eliminate competition between different healthcare in-
stitutions for contracts with the purchaser, which is a key feature of the 
purchaser–provider separation model. It is also unclear if, and to what ex-
tent, contractual relations between KCS and the Health Financing Agen-
cy will be based on competitive contract award procedures. In fact, KCS 
will have a monopoly over providing healthcare services funded by the 
budget for the secondary and tertiary healthcare levels, which will render 
any competitive contract award procedures obsolete.
On the other hand, the Health Financing Agency is mandated to also 
contract directly with healthcare institutions for the provision of basic and 
supplementary healthcare services. However, nowhere is it explicitly stat-
ed that such contracts should be awarded on a competitive basis. Instead, 
the Health Financing Agency is only required to set a performance stim-
ulation scheme for health professionals and relevant professional services 
at all three levels of healthcare, based on objective and transparent criteria 
to meet the volume and quality indicators of healthcare services provided 
by the sub-legal act issued by the Ministry. This structure causes confu-
sion and seems to be in contradiction to the above claim that the price 
list for healthcare services offered by KCS funded by the budget must be 
approved by the Health Financing Agency. It is therefore not clear when 
the Health Financing Agency should enter into a contract with KCS, and 
when with individual healthcare institutions.
A further element to be considered is the fact that KCS and its compo-
nent healthcare institutions will continue to be funded by the budget. 
This may reduce incentives to be cost-effective, especially as the Ministry 
and the Government stand behind both KCS and the Health Financ-
ing Agency because the management of both entities is appointed by the 
government. This may also lead to the question of whether there is real 
separation between purchaser and provider, which will focus on improv-
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ing efficiency and be insulated from political considerations, and to what 
extent KCS and the Health Financing Agency will be immune from po-
litical interference.
5.2.  Kosovo Clinical Services
The legal nature of Kosovo Clinical Services is not clear and may lead 
to confusion in regard to its relationship with its constituent healthcare 
institutions. On the one hand, KCS is defined by the Law on Health 
(Art. 3, paragraph 1.18) as a healthcare institution, which means that it 
is a provider of healthcare services. However, healthcare services are in 
fact provided by the healthcare institutions which are members of KCS. 
The functions assigned to KCS relate primarily to negotiation with the 
Health Financing Agency, management, analysis, planning, and quality 
control. The Statute of KCS (Art. 6) defines the healthcare institutions 
which are part of KCS as autonomous units that organise and manage 
their common and regular administrative and professional affairs in or-
der to fulfil their duties and legal responsibilities, save for the functions 
vested in KCS. Healthcare institutions can also contract directly with the 
Health Financing Agency. These aspects indicate that KCS is a manage-
rial “superstructure” for its member healthcare institutions, or an associa-
tion of healthcare institutions, rather than a healthcare institution which 
provides healthcare services.
On the other hand, KCS receives payments from the public budget, while 
no such budget is granted to its member healthcare institutions. KCS may 
also negotiate directly with the Health Financing Agency. In relation to 
the healthcare institutions, KCS prepares proposals of internal acts of its 
member healthcare institutions for approval by the minister of health; it 
ensures that the organisational and functional units of KCS are well-man-
aged; that their directors are focused on quality healthcare services and 
have ambitious and realistic financing plans; and it approves profits, fu-
sions, divisions, and dissolutions of the organisational units of KCS. The 
picture presented by these functions and responsibilities indicates that 
KCS seems to be more than just a managerial superstructure of an associ-
ation of healthcare institutions, but instead the nucleus of a future unified 
and integrated healthcare institution.
KCS can therefore at best be defined as a hybrid institution, which is at 
present a managerial superstructure entrusted with the management of its 
constituent healthcare institutions and which may develop in future into 
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a unified healthcare institution. Its hybrid character may lead to legal and 
organisational ambiguity and thus contribute to difficulties with regard to 
the clear definition of contractual relations between the Health Financing 
Agency and the providers of healthcare services. 
5.3.  Performance-Based Contracting
The Ministry piloted the introduction of performance contracts with all 
public healthcare institutions in 2013. Based on this experience, it decid-
ed to introduce permanent performance contracting with all hospitals. 
The expectation is that all public health institutions will enter into per-
formance contracts with the Health Financing Agency, to be superseded 
by the Health Insurance Fund, which also must build the basic capacity 
to monitor the implementation of the contract, to support decision-mak-
ing with respect to performance payment, and to administer performance 
payment. 
A proper performance-based contracting mechanism requires the in-
troduction of performance-based management structures within KCS, 
healthcare institutions, and the Health Financing Agency. KCS and 
healthcare institutions must have the organisational and personnel ca-
pacity for establishing strategic performance objectives, measuring per-
formance, collecting, analysing, reviewing, and reporting performance 
data, and using those data to drive performance improvement. This ca-
pacity is very limited at present. In addition, the implementation of per-
formance-based contracting will require a fundamental restructuring of 
healthcare institutions not only in terms of structure and process, but also 
in terms of reframing the mindset of its managers and employees so as to 
become customer, results, and performance oriented. Performance-based 
contracting without equivalent performance-based management struc-
tures may not create the right incentives and may lead to a failure of this 
policy.
5.4.  Sequencing and Coordination of Reform
The organisational building blocks of the reform, i.e., the Ministry of 
Health, professional chambers, KCS, the Health Financing Agency, and 
the Health Insurance Fund have attained different levels of policy atten-
tion and different levels of development.
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KCS is well-advanced in terms of establishing its management struc-
ture, but a comprehensive clarification of its role and relationship with 
its member healthcare institutions is still lacking. Neither KCS nor the 
healthcare institutions have started to establish performance-based man-
agement structures, although the implementation of performance-based 
contracts is already in progress. The Health Financing Agency is in a sim-
ilar situation. The Ministry has divested itself of operational functions by 
transferring them to KCS, but it has not restructured itself to adjust to its 
new regulatory function. The professional chambers are not operational 
yet, as their functions are still being exercised by the Ministry.
The successful implementation of the reform will require a careful se-
quencing and synchronisation of reform steps, while ensuring the overall 
continuity of healthcare regulatory functions and services. It must be en-
sured that all the building blocks of the reform are managed and reformed 
in such a manner that they assume and exercise their new functions in a 
coordinated way.
This requires a comprehensive policy and a detailed implementation plan; 
however, both are missing. There is an impression that the implementation 
of the reform does not follow an established plan, but an incremental logic 
with the possibility of making modifications and adjustments along the way. 
Although the reform design and implementation process is concentrated in 
the Ministry of Health, there is no central unit or task force within the Min-
istry which would assist in steering and monitoring the reform process. Fur-
thermore, stakeholder involvement is minimal, with the consequence that 
the healthcare profession and the public have limited information about the 
ongoing reform process and the expected outcomes. 
The reform process is exposed to multiple risks that need to be managed 
to avoid another reform failure. The reform process may encounter re-
sistance from healthcare institutions due to the introduction of perfor-
mance-based management and a payment system with which they are 
not familiar and lack the necessary expertise. Lack of clarity about the 
relationship between the healthcare institutions and KCS may dimin-
ish support for the integration of the healthcare institutions into KCS. 
Overly complex and unclear management structures within KCS, coupled 
with a lack of professional leadership and a shortage of staff trained and 
experienced in the establishment and operation of contract and perfor-
mance-based management structures may lead to a dysfunctional KCS. 
Resistance may also come from certain parts of the civil service of the 
Ministry, due to the loss of control over and influence on the operational 
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aspects of healthcare services, e.g. public procurement and human re-
sources management, as these functions have been transferred to KCS. 
The Ministry may hesitate to focus exclusively on policy formulation and 
supervision and thus refrain from intervening the in operational aspects of 
KCS and the Health Financing Agency. A recent decision of the Ministry 
to relax licensing requirements for clinical psychologists may be indicative 
of the imminence of such a risk.
A further key challenge for the Ministry will be to restructure internally 
to be able to effectively exercise its regulatory functions and to steer the 
reform process. A specific issue in this context is the sequencing of activ-
ities to implement the purchaser–provider split and performance-based 
management, while establishing the organisational units of the health 
sector. The risk is that the Ministry may be moving forward with the es-
tablishment of the legal and institutional framework without devoting the 
necessary attention and resources to building the required human and 
structural capacity to implement performance-based management and 
the purchaser–provider split model. Public support for the reform could 
also diminish if improvements in healthcare services are not quickly visi-
ble.
The development and implementation of a sound stakeholder manage-
ment system is a critical prerequisite for mitigating risks emanating from 
stakeholders. It is essential that expectations related to the outcomes of 
the reform are managed in a realistic manner. Ensuring transparency and 
the meaningful participation of all stakeholders in the reform process is 
of paramount importance in order to generate support and diminish re-
sistance. The development and implementation of a properly structured 
and sequenced change management system is also critical to the success 
of the reform, especially in order to implement the envisaged perfor-
mance-based management system and the purchaser–provider separation 
model.
6. Conclusion
This entire reform process may require Kosovo to deliver more than it is 
able to because of its weak administrative capacity. Regarding the health 
sector, the EU Progress Report for Kosovo in 2014 specifically highlighted 
that public health spending would remain among the lowest in the region 
and that this would hinder the implementation and enforcement of sector 
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reforms and policies. The EU also noted that with respect to the overall 
performance of Kosovo’s public sector the capacity in ministries to plan 
and budget remains limited (EC, 2014, p. 10). The EU also expressed the 
criticism that regarding public service and human resources management 
political interference in public administration would continue to persist, 
both at the central and local level, and that very limited progress has been 
made to further improve accountability and service delivery (EC, 2014, 
p. 11). The report noted that Kosovo has not addressed public financial 
management reforms systematically, as part of a comprehensive reform 
plan; that its medium-term expenditure framework, which covers the peri-
od 2015–2017, lacks a strategic approach; and that the annual budgeting 
process would still be based on the line-item approach (EC, 2014, p. 11). 
Most importantly, the implementation of public internal financial control 
would still be at an early stage, as the managerial accountability principle 
has not yet been embedded in the management culture (EC, 2014, p. 12).
The introduction of a complex public management system characterised 
by a purchaser–provider split and performance-based contracting in the 
health sector, while the overall administrative system is built on the princi-
ples of traditional public administration, coupled with weak management 
and implementation capacities, looks like a recipe for another reform fail-
ure. It is difficult to imagine how such a reform will work when the rest of 
the administrative system, including budgeting and human resources man-
agement, operates in a bureaucratic manner, following traditional public 
administration models. The risk is that this incongruence between a perfor-
mance-oriented health sector and the rest of the public administration will 
lead to confusion and conflicts, and eventually result in reform fatigue. It 
may also expose the reform process to attacks from various interest groups, 
which see their vested interests threatened by the reform process and see 
exploiting these structural defects as a chance to undermine the reform. In 
the end, the success of the reform will depend on the determination of the 
Ministry of Health to continue with the reform process and to first reform 
itself to be able to competently steer the reform process. 
The Ministry of Health must take the following seriously: reform means 
sustained and purposive change and it is a process which requires a signif-
icant period of time and resources. The Ministry of Health will also need 
to resist the temptation to fall back into the “old practices” of getting in-
volved in operation matters which have been devolved to KCS, the Health 
Insurance Fund, and professional chambers. If the reform succeeds, i.e., 
if the purchaser–provider split and performance-based contracting indeed 
work out as expected, there is a good chance that the public management 
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oriented reform of the health sector may have spillover effects on other 
areas of Kosovo’s public sector, such as budgeting and civil service. If 
not, then bureaucratic administration will continue to be the standard for 
some time.
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THE CHALLENGE OF INTRODUCING NEW PUBLIC 
MANAGEMENT TO KOSOVO’S HEALTHCARE SECTOR
Summary
The paper outlines the current healthcare sector reform process in Kosovo and the 
challenges to its implementation. The reform attempts to introduce modern pub-
lic management principles into Kosovo’s healthcare sector, including a purchas-
er–provider split, performance incentives, and performance-based contracting, 
as well as a reorganisation of healthcare service delivery with a view to improving 
effectiveness and efficiency. This is the first major reform of the healthcare sec-
tor since Kosovo declared independence in 2008, and it intends to replace the 
healthcare system established by the United Nations between 1999 and 2008. 
Kosovo’s earlier healthcare system had been characterised by decentralised de-
cision-making, but was re-established by the UN in the form of an emergency 
healthcare system after the UN was deployed to administer Kosovo in 1999. 
The reform envisages separating healthcare regulators from healthcare providers 
and healthcare purchasers. Kosovo Hospital and University Clinical Services 
is established as a new entity providing healthcare services, and a new Health 
Insurance Fund will become the healthcare purchaser. The Ministry of Health 
will be restricted to the functions of a regulator, divested of all administrative 
functions in favour of healthcare providers and purchasers. A major challenge 
lies in the limited capacities of the Kosovo Government to implement such an 
ambitious reform. This is also an attempt to introduce modern public manage-
ment principles into a public administration which is dominated by traditional 
public administration principles. Lack of implementation capacities and con-
tradictory public administration principles are the most important factors that 
may endanger the successful implementation of the reform.
Keywords: healthcare reform, public management, public administration, pur-
chaser–provider split, performance-based contracting, Kosovo
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IZAZOV UVOĐENJA NOVOGA JAVNOG MENADŽMENTA U 
KOSOVSKI ZDRAVSTVENI SEKTOR 
Sažetak
U radu se opisuje reforma zdravstvenog sektora Kosova te izazovi s kojima se 
ona susreće. U sklopu reforme u kosovski se zdravstveni sektor nastoje uvesti na-
čela modernog javnog menadžmenta, uključujući podjelu na pružatelja i kupca 
javnih usluga te ugovaranje temeljeno na rezultatima. Također, nastoji se pro-
vesti reorganizacija pružanja zdravstvenih usluga s ciljem povećanja djelotvor-
nosti i učinkovitosti. Radi se o prvoj opsežnoj reformi kosovskoga zdravstvenog 
sektora od proglašenja nezavisnosti 2008. te se njome nastoji zamijeniti sustav 
koji su Ujedinjeni narodi postavili u izvanrednim okolnostima 1999., a kojim je 
zamijenjen dotadašnji zdravstveni sustav koji se temeljio na decentraliziranom 
odlučivanju. Reformom se namjerava razdvojiti regulatore zdravstvenog sustava 
od pružatelja i kupaca zdravstvenih usluga. Uvodi se unitarna ustanova nazva-
na Kosovske kliničke usluge kao novi pružatelj zdravstvenih usluga, dok novi 
Fond za zdravstveno osiguranje preuzima ulogu kupca zdravstvenih usluga. 
Funkcija Ministarstva zdravstva bit će isključivo regulacijska te će ono izgubiti 
sve upravljačke funkcije u korist pružatelja i kupaca zdravstvenih usluga. S 
obzirom na velike ambicije koje se ovom reformom žele ostvariti, velik izazov 
predstavljaju ograničeni provedbeni kapaciteti kosovske vlade. Reforma također 
predstavlja pokušaj uvođenja modernih načela javnog menadžmenta u javnu 
upravu kojom dominiraju tradicionalna načela. Upravo manjak provedbenih 
kapaciteta i proturječna načela predstavljaju glavne faktore koji bi mogli ugro-
ziti uspješnu provedbu reforme.
Ključne riječi: reforma zdravstva, javni menadžment, javna uprava, podjela na 
pružatelja i kupca, ugovaranje temeljeno na rezultatima, Kosovo
